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STATUTES OF REPOSE IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: DEATH BEFORE
CONCEPTION?
by Laurie L. Kralky
TATUTES of limitation are legislatively prescribed time limits on
the assertion of otherwise valid legal claims. I The statutes are proce-
dural devices intended to protect courts and defendants from the dif-
ficulties of resolving stale claims.2 By penalizing a plaintiff for delay in
asserting his rights, statutes of limitation treat the ability to pursue a cause
of action as a privilege instead of a right. The statutes focus on the con-
duct of the plaintiff, not on the merits of his claim.3 Traditionally they
have been recognized as procedural, rather than substantive, statutes; be-
cause they are matters of remedy rather than right, they are subject to a
large degree of legislative discretion and corresponding judicial
deference. 4
Statutes of limitation may, however, be more than mere procedural de-
vices intended to effect administrative convenience. The application and
operation of such limitations often raise important philosophical, eco-
nomic, political, and constitutional issues.5 These issues become especially
pronounced in the context of products liability actions, where a plaintiff
injured by a product may be barred from seeking recovery due to the oper-
ation of a statute of limitation.6 In that sense the statutes have played a
1. See generally Comment, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV.
L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950) (discussion of variety and purpose of statutes of limitation).
2. The United States Supreme Court has voiced this justification many times. See
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). But see Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965), where the court stated that the "policy of repose,
designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed ... where the interests of justice
require vindication of the plaintiffs rights."
3. Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitations-A New Immunity for Product Suppli-
ers, 1977 INs. L.J. 535, 537.
4. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also Comment,
Statutes of Limitations: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 775 (1970) (discussion of theoretical and pragmatic issues involved when statutes of
limitation are applied in products actions).
5. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes
of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 579, 581 (1981), for an in-depth examination of the sometimes
"non-legal" issues surrounding statutes of limitation.
6. See, e.g., Citizens Casualty Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 10 Mich. App. 244, 159 N.W.2d
223, 225 (1968) (negligence and warranty action against manufacturer of tank truck barred
by three-year statute of limitation); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 116, 286 A.2d
718, 720 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (action by tires purchaser injured in blowout barred by
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role in preventing manufacturers from becoming absolute insurers of their
products. 7 These limitations, however, have done little to alleviate what
manufacturers perceive as their susceptibility to perpetual liability. This
concern by manufacturers has led to a legislative backlash in recent years
resulting in the enactment of products liability statutes of repose.
Statutes of repose usually provide a maximum limitation period running
from the date of manufacture or sale during which an action must be
brought. Once that time period has elapsed an action is completely
barred. 8 Thus, while a statute of limitation bars a cause of action some-
time after injury, a statute of repose can bar a cause of action before it ever
accrues, that is, before the injury occurs. In this sense statutes of repose
can be thought of as affecting substantive rights. This characteristic distin-
guishes statutes of repose from purely procedural statutes of limitation. 9
Repose statutes are therefore considered different in degree, if not in kind,
from statutes of limitation. 10 This Comment analyzes the operation, vari-
ety, and constitutionality of various statutes of repose, and explores the
probability of the enactment and efficacy of a similar products liability
statute of repose in Texas. This Comment concludes that statutes of repose
for products actions are contrary to the philosophy behind strict products
liability because such statutes deprive the injured consumer of his right of
action.
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THEORY AND POLICY
Products liability involves the liability of a manufacturer of a product"
two-year statute of limitation), aff'd, 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); see also infra notes 51 -
85 and accompanying text (statutes of limitation in products liability actions).
7. Although the liability in a strict products liability action is indeed often strict, it is
not absolute. Courts have never gone so far as to hold manufacturers absolute insurers of
their products. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
8. See Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability. The Assault Upon the Citadel
of Strict Liability, 23 S.D.L. REV. 149 (1978) (overview of such statutes).
9. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1186-88, for a discussion of the substantive and
procedural characteristics of statutes of limitation. These characteristics become crucial in
choice of law questions. Traditional statutes of limitation are classified as procedural; thus
the law of the forum state applies. If statutes of repose are characterized as more substantive
than procedural, the law of the place where the cause of action arose would apply. The
multistate character of most products actions makes this distinction increasingly important
and complex. See Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation:. An Effective Means of Imple-
menting Change in Products Liability Law?, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 123, 130 (1979) (choice
of law problems involving statutes of repose); see also Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in Con-
flict of Laws. Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 287 (1960).
10. A great deal of confusion exists as to whether a statute of repose is really a statute of
limitation as opposed to an entirely separate statutory entity. See Hawkins v. D. & J. Press
Co., 527 F. Supp. 386, 388 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (Tennessee's statute of repose not conventional
statute of limitation); Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Ten-
nessee's repose statute not normal limitation statute).
11. In this Comment the term "manufacturer" will be used to describe all persons regu-
larly engaged in the business of supplying or marketing a product. This liability extends not
only to manufacturers as defined by the layman, but also to retailers of the product,
Vandermarck v. Ford, 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)
(retailer an "integral part of. . . marketing enterprise"); lessors, Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., I
Ill. App. 3d 272, 274N.E.2d 178, 182-83 (1971) (lessor of van strictly liable for injuries
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
for the harm to person or property caused by a defect in that product. 12
For an injured consumer to recover in any products liability action, he
must show that the manufacturer was the maker or seller of the product
that caused his injuries, and that the product was somehow foreseeably
dangerous or defective at the time it left the manufacturer's hands. 13 Con-
siderable confusion presently surrounds products liability actions, how-
ever, because a consumer can proceed upon one or more of three possible
theories of recovery-negligence, warranty, or strict liabilityl 4-each in-
volving potentially differing standards of conduct and liability, and subject
to differing statutes of limitation. 15
A. Negligence
At early common law a person injured by a negligently manufactured
product could not recover unless he could prove that the manufacturer had
breached a contractual duty owed to him. 16 Thus, if a manufacturer sold a
product to a retailer, and the retailer subsequently sold it to a consumer,
the consumer could not recover from the manufacturer for negligence be-
cause no contractual relationship existed between them.' 7 The require-
ment of a contractual relationship, or privity, between manufacturers and
caused by defective brakes); assemblers of component parts, Pender Constr. Co. v. Finley,
485 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Ky. 1972) (assembler of skid shovel part proved defective, held strictly
liable); franchisors, Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 352-53 (6th Cir. 1979)
(franchisor who retained control over franchisee's behavior held liable for defective prod-
uct); and potentially any other person in the chain of manufacture. A discussion of the
apportionment of liability between these possible defendants is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a proposed statutory mechanism of apportionment, see MODEL UNIFORM
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 105, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,726 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
UPLA].
12. For a comprehensive overview of the historical development of products liability
actions, see D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 1-12 (1974); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-98 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault]; Pros-
ser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The
Fall].
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Comment, supra note 8,
at 150 (discussing plaintiff's burden of proof in lroducts liability action).
14. For practical considerations of which a plaintiff should be av~are in choosing a the-
ory of recovery, see generally W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11 (1979); P.
SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 12.11 (1981). Cases
illustrating differing results under different theories of recovery include Grenno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (complaint against truck manufacturer for
injuries sustained sufficient to state claim for relief based on strict liability); Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (purchaser recovered from
manufacturer for truck defect in breach of warranty action); Santa v. A. & M. Karogheu-
sian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (plaintiff allowed breach of implied warranty
action directly against manufacturer, despite lack of privity).
15. See infra notes 51-85 and accompanying text.
16. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
17. The first cases deviating from the privity requirement involved food and products
with inherently dangerous characteristics. See, e.g., Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918) (chewin& tobacco); Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L.
748, 70 A. 314 (1908) (food); Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870) (saw); Boyd v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1914) (drink).
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consumers was abandoned in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 18 and liabil-
ity for ordinary negligence was imposed on the manufacturer. ' 9 The Mac-
Pherson court reasoned that manufacturers were in a better position than
consumers to anticipate the potential uses and dangers of their products.20
The court therefore imposed a duty upon manufacturers to exercise ordi-
nary care in the manufacture of their products and to guard against rea-
sonably foreseeable injuries resulting from the use of those products. 2'
Proving that a manufacturer has failed to exercise reasonable care is no
easy task,22 however, and may be further complicated by the availability of
affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
and misuse. 23
B. Warranty
An injured consumer may also seek to hold a manufacturer liable for
breach of an express or implied warranty if the product sold is unfit for its
foreseeable use or below its represented quality.24 Actions in warranty
may be grounded on express contract or affirmation of fact,25 or on a le-
gally implied warranty that the product is safe for normal use. 26 The lia-
bility imposed in warranty actions is strict in the sense that it is imposed
without regard to whether the manufacturer exercised due care or was in
any way at fault.27 In this way an injured plaintiff may sidestep the often
impossible burden of proof associated with negligence actions. 28 Recovery
18. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (manufacturer of automobile with defective
wheel found negligent for failing to inspect).
19. 111 N.E. at 1053.
20. Id. In imposing the affirmative duty to inspect, Justice Cardozo stated: "The more
probable the danger the greater the need of caution. . . . Reliance on the skill of the manu-
facturer was proper and almost inevitable." Id. at 1055.
21. Id. at 1054. For a discussion of MacPherson and its impact on products liability
law, see W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 96, at 642-43; Comment, supra note 8, at 152-53. See
also Peck, Negligence and Liability without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225 (1971)
(survey of tort law showing development of liability without fault).
22. See infra notes 102-03, 113-14 and accompanying text (problems both manufactur-
ers and consumers often encounter in proving and defending products liability action).
23. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 219-43; W. PROSSER, supra note 12,
§§ 65-68; Comment, supra note 8, at 159-63.
24. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934), where the
manufacturer of an automobile with a defective windshield was held strictly liable. Al-
though the action was based on express warranty, the Baxter court held that a manufacturer
should be strictly liable for all representations upon which consumers must rely, regardless
of the type of contractual relationship between parties. 35 P.2d at 1091; see also W. PROS-
sER, supra note 12, § 97 (discussing warranty liability based on express representations); P.
SHERMAN, supra note 14, § 3 (discussion of warranty actions in products liability).
25. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) (express warranties defined).
26. Cases in which an implied warranty was imposed as a matter of social policy as
opposed to as a matter of contract or tort law include Schley v. Zalis, 172 Md. 336, 191 A.
563 (1937) (frozen tomatoes); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder building blocks); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capp,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (food). Implied warranties have been codified in the
Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) (Implied Warranty of Merchantability);
id. § 2-315 (1978) (Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Use).
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 97, at 650-51; Comment, supra note 8, at 153.
28. Not only does the burden of proof differ in negligence and warranty actions, but so
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in warranty, however, is often confusing due to the hybrid character of the
action, which originated in both tort and contract. 29 Because warranty was
traditionally viewed as a contract action, courts usually required the exist-
ence of privity between buyer and seller.30 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. 31 this privity requirement was abandoned and a form of strict
liability was imposed upon a manufacturer in a warranty action.32 Hen-
ningsen extended the protection of an implied warranty not only to the
ultimate consumer, but to all foreseeable users.33 Actions in warranty, like
those in negligence, are subject to a number of procedural defenses, in-
cluding notice requirements, 34 disclaimers, 35 and statutes of limitation. 36
C. Strict Liability
Because of the difficulties involved in bringing products actions under
negligence or warranty theories, some commentators began to suggest that
manufacturers of defective products should be held strictly liable as a mat-
ter of public policy.37 In the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products38 this suggestion became law. The California Supreme Court ab-
rogated privity and standard of care requirements and imposed strict tort
liability on manufacturers whose defective products caused injury to users
or consumers.39 This theory of recovery was codified in section 402A of
does the type of recoverable damages. Generally, if a plaintiff suffers economic injury along
with personal or property injury, he can recover for the economic losses under any theory.
When only economic loss is involved, however, the manufacturer may not be liable under
negligence, but may be liable under warranty. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 107-
14.
29. For a discussion of the hybrid character of products liability warranty actions and
the problems arising from warranty's origin in both tort and contract, see D. NOEL & J.
PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 13-15; Prosser, The Assault, supra note 12, at 1127-34; Prosser,
The Fall, supra note 12, at 800-05.
30. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, American Law of Products Liability § 10:8 (2d ed. 1974).
31. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (breach of warranty action against manufacturer of
auto that caused injury to purchaser's wife).
32. 161 A.2d at 100-01. The Henningsen court enunciated what soon came to be known
as the inherently dangerous doctrine:
[W]here the commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they
will be dangerous to life and limb, then society's interests can only be pro-
tected by eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his
dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer. In that way the bur-
den of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who
are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution
of the losses when they do occur.
Id. at 81.
33. Id. at 100.
34. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1978).
35. Id. § 2-316.
36. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring): "[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs
an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."
38. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
39. 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
19831
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts40 and ultimately adopted by statute or
judicial decision in a majority of states.4' In order to recover under a the-
ory of strict tort liability, an injured consumer must prove that the product
causing injury, because of its defective condition, was "unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer" when it left the manufacturer's hands.42
No contractual relationship or lack of care on the part of the manufacturer
need be shown.43 The category of available defenses to strict liability has
been reduced to include only misuse, 44 assumption of risk, 45 and statutes
of limitation.46 Contributory negligence or disclaimers of liability will not
defeat recovery. 47 The policy reasons advanced to justify this increased
liability are many and varied. 48 Aside from the protection of human life
and compensation of injured parties, many have argued that the manufac-
turer is in a better economic position to control the risks and spread the
losses associated with defective products. 49 Others contend that strict lia-
bility provides the incentive necessary for the production of safe prod-
ucts.5 0 Against this background of broad manufacturer liability legislative
reforms such as statutes of repose have evolved and must be analyzed.
Before these statutes can be explored, however, it is first necessary to ex-
amine the role played and confusion engendered by traditional statutes of
limitation in products liability actions.
40. (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The key factor is finding the product
"defective." Hence, the liability of manufacturers is not absolute.
41. For the present status of strict liability in the various states, see 2 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[3] n.2 (1983).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
43. Id.
44. Misuse occurs when a user or consumer of a product uses or mishandles it in an
unusual and unforeseeable way. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 102, at 668-69.
45. In order to prove the assumption of the risk defense a manufacturer must show that
the consumer knew and appreciated the risk attending a defective product, but nevertheless
voluntarily proceeded to encounter it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment
n (1965).
46. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (plaintiff
has two years after cause of action accrues in which to bring products liability claim).
47. See Comment, supra note 8, at 159-64 (defenses available in products liability
action).
48. See generally Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681 (1980) (discussion of traditional policies behind strict liability and their applicabil-
ity in light of modern realities).
49. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960). But
see Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free Enterprise, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
313 (1978) (questioning risk allocation rationale in a free market society).
50. McGovern, supra note 5, at 590.
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II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY: VARIETY
AND CONFUSION
The problem of determining which statute of limitation applies, and
when that statute begins to run, becomes complicated in the context of
products liability actions. At present several possible statutes of limitation,
with differing limitation periods and accrual points, may apply depending
on whether the action is brought in negligence, warranty, or strict liability,
whether the injury is to person or property, and whether a contract, if in-
volved, is written or oral. Hence, a plaintiff may effectively choose among
several statutes of limitation depending upon how he pleads his case. 51
The ability to plead alternative theories of recovery can lead to the anom-
aly of having several statutes of limitation applicable to the same underly-
ing cause of action.52
Negligence. Most state courts treat products liability suits grounded in
negligence as subject to the state's general tort or negligence statutes. 53
These vary in length from one to six years, 54 with two years the most com-
mon period.5 5 The majority of jurisdictions have held that a products lia-
bility cause of action founded on a manufacturer's failure to exercise due
care accrues at the time of injury.5 6 In addition, courts often apply a "dis-
covery rule" to products actions, holding that a cause of action accrues at
the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered, his injury.5 7 This accrual date may be further postponed
until the plaintiff discovers the causal relationship between his injury and
51. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 320-25; McGovern, The Status of
Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions. Present and Fu-
ture, 16 FORUM 416, 420 (1981); Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform ofProducts Liabil-
ity Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1978); Note, supra note 9, at 130.
52. Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 972, 975-76 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (warranty
actions controlled by UCC period, and negligence action governed by personal injury stat-
ute); Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1970) (UCC
governs warranty part of action, while tort statute governs personal injury part).
53. See, e.g., Boans v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Conn. 1971); Rodibaugh
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 570, 37 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1964); Blessington v.
McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
54. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 14, § 292, at 318. Some jurisdictions may also
have different limitation periods for personal and property damage. Id.
55. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
56. See, e.g., Rodibaugh v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 570, 37 Cal. Rptr.
646, 647-48 (1964) (accrual when plaintiff injured by bulldozer); Canon v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1978) (cause of action for ladder collapse accrued
at date of injury). Some jurisdictions hold that products liability actions in negligence ac-
crue at the date of sale. Such date-of-sale treatment typically results from peculiarly worded
negligence statutes. See Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952)
(personal injury statute barring actions brought more than one year after date of "act or
omission complained of" held to accrue at time defective rifle was put on market by
manufacturer).
57. 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, § 39.01[3]; see also Birnbaum, "First
Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Product Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279 (1977)




the defendant's conduct. 58 Thus, statutes of limitation in negligence ac-
tions have historically been liberally construed to allow an injured plaintiff
to seek judicial redress.
Warranty. Establishing when a cause of action accrues in warranty is a
perplexing task, due to the contract and tort origins of warranty, as well as
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which contains
its own statute of limitation in warranty actions. The UCC requires that
the cause of action be brought within four years of the date on which the
breach occurs.5 9 A breach of warranty is generally held to accrue at the
time of delivery or sale, unless the warranty explicitly extends to future
performance. 60 The warranty limitation applies regardless of the plain-
tiffs knowledge of breach or ihjury. 61 Thus, there is no discovery rule in
UCC warranty statutes of limitation.
Before the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, most
states took the position that the tort statute of limitation applied in prod-
ucts liability actions regardless of whether the action was brought under an
implied warranty theory.62 After widespread enactment of the UCC, how-
ever, a considerable split of authority developed, and still exists, on the
issue of whether the contract or tort statute of limitation applies in prod-
ucts actions.63 A minority of jurisdictions retain the common law rule that
implied warranty actions are essentially tort actions and therefore apply
the personal injury statute of limitation.64 Most jurisdictions, on the other
58. See, e.g., Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff
injured by drug barred from bringing action because she discovered injury five years before
suit); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 151 (1978) (DES
and prenatal injury; statute begins at discovery), rev'd on other grounds, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Ky. 1979) (lung cancer caused by asbestos;
statute commences at discovery).
59. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978). Section 2-725(2) sets the date of accrual, providing:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when
the tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
Id. § 2-725(2). Thus, the UCC has no discovery rule except where the warranty deals with
future performance.
60. A warranty of future performance is breached at the time the breach is or should
have been discovered. Such a warranty must be explicit, however, and is found only if the
buyer must wait until some future event occurs before he can determine whether the war-
ranty was breached. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 54
(2d ed. 1975 & Supp. 1981).
61. Id. The rule in Texas appears contrary to this general rule. See infra note 225 and
accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 169-70 (operation of statutes of limi-
tation in breach of warranty cases).
62. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 60, at 83-84. The confusion as to which statute
of limitations is applicable in warranty is generally confined to implied warranty actions. A
state's contract or UCC statute of limitation is usually held to govern express warranty ac-
tions, which have their historical basis in contract.
63. Id. at 69.
64. See, e.g., Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1973) (West
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hand, stress the contractual nature of warranty and hold that the four-year
UCC limitation applies.65 These jurisdictions usually require the injured
plaintiff to be in privity with the manufacturer.66 A third group of juris-
dictions, however, allows an action to be maintained under the UCC four-
year s*.tute even in the absence of privity.67 If the UCC or contract statute
is held applicable to a products action, it generally will be deemed to run
from date of sale, delivery, or installation. 68 A plaintiff who is injured
after the expiration of that time, therefore, may be barred from recovery
before he is even injured.69
Strict Liability. The authorities are fairly uniform in holding that when an
action is brought in strict liability, a tort-like statute of limitation con-
trols,70 and that the statute is triggered at the date of injury or discovery of
injury, rather than at the date of sale.7' In Victorson v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co. ,72 for example, a plaintiff brought a strict liability action
against the manufacturer of a defective centrifuge extractor. The machine
had been sold in 1948 but the injury did not occur until 1969. The court in
Victorson initially recognized that a products liability claim may be predi-
cated on express or implied warranty, negligence, or strict liability, 73 and
that when an action is brought in strict liability, it sounds in tort rather
than contract.74 Because the suit had been brought in strict liability, the
court held that the statute of limitation for personal injury and property
Virginia); Natale v. Upjohn Co., 356 F.2d 590, 591 (3d Cir. 1966) (Delaware); Tyler v. R.R.
Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541, 542 (E.D. Va. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 512 P.2d 776, 777-78
(1973).
66. See, e.g., id., 512 P.2d at 780-81.
67. See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 513 (Ala. 1979); Commercial
Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 773 (Tenn. 1979); Garcia v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 465 (Tex. 1980). For a discussion of statutes of
limitation in warranty products actions, and the three different approaches, see W. KIMBLE
& R. LESHER, supra note 14, at 321-25.
68. Harvey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 315 A.2d 599, 601 (Del. 1973) (breach occurred,
and statute of limitation ran, when aluminum stepladder was sold, not when it collapsed);
Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., II A.D.2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1011-12 (1960) (cause of
action for breach of warranty accrued when silo erected, not at time of accident).
69. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969), where the court in a pre-UCC implied warranty action held
that the six-year contract statute of limitation, running from time of sale, rather than the
three-year tort limitation running from date of injury, barred plaintiff's claim. Mendel was
subsequently overruled in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335
N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). For a discussion of Victorson, see infra notes 72-78 and
accompanying text.
70. Note, supra note 9, at 135; see Nelson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 315 F. Supp.
1120, 1123 (D.N.H. 1970); Sevilla v. Steams-Roger, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 608, 610, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 700, 702 (1980); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125, 131
(1968), rev'don other grounds, 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
71. See, e.g., Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1969);
Ford Motor Co. v. Broadway, 374 So. 2d 207, 209 (Miss. 1979); Romano v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 114 R.I. 451, 336 A.2d 555, 559-60 (1975).
72. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
73. Id. at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 276-77, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
74. Id. at 402, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
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damage applied.75 The Victorson court further concluded that this limita-
tion period commenced, not at the time of sale,76 but at the date of in-
jury.77 In so holding the court rejected the defendant's argument that the
decision would subject manufacturers to unreasonable liability.78
Another defendant advanced the same argument in Romano v. Westing-
house Electric Co. ,79 a products liability action involving property damage
caused when a television set exploded and set fire to the plaintiff's home.
The defendant argued that, at least as to property damage, the six-year
statute of limitation should commence at the date of sale, not the date of
injury. The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected this rationale and held
that an indefinite date of accrual did not conflict with the purpose underly-
ing the statute of limitation.80
Property damage was also the subject of the claim in Rosenau v. City of
New Brunswick,81 where a homeowner brought a strict liability action
against a water meter manufacturer for damage caused by the breaking of
the meter. The manufacturer in Rosenau advanced arguments similar to
those made in Romano. The Rosenau court held that the action accrued at
the time of damage, even though the damage occurred fourteen years after
the meter had been installed and twenty-two years after the original sale. 82
To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would defeat the liberal spirit of
strict products liability.83 Since the manufacturer had placed the defective
product in the stream of commerce, it had a duty to protect against and
distribute the risk of loss attendant to that defective product. According to
the court, the strict liability plaintiff would still have to prove that the
product was defective, a burden that was intensified by the lapse of time. 84
The manufacturer, however, argued that such reasoning meant that it
could be held liable, without any proof of negligence, for injury occurring
many decades after the product left its control. Indeed, a manufacturer
could be held liable even if the product had outlived its anticipated life or
75. Id. at 404, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
76. Id. at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44. Victorson overruled the previous
New York rule set out in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 253
N.E.2d 207, 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969), that the contract statute of limitation running
from date of sale governed similar actions.
77. 37 N.Y.2d at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The court noted that while
the passage of time may have worked a "deterioration of the manufacturer's capability to
defend, by similar token it can be expected to complicate the plaintiff's problem of proving
• . . that the alleged defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's plant." Id.
at 404, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
78. Id.
79. 114 R.I. 451, 336 A.2d 555, 560 (1975).
80. 336 A.2d at 560. The court stated that the policy behind a statute of limitation was
to prevent a plaintiff from intentionally sleeping on his rights, thereby gaining an unfair
advantage over the defendant, and not to create a finite period of potential liability for the
tortfeasor. The injustice of barring a plaintiff's action before it could reasonably be brought
outweighed any unfairness to the defendant in requiring it to defend the action. Id. at 560-
61.
81. 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
82. 238 A.2d at 172.




if it had not been properly maintained by the plaintiff, assuming it was
defective when it left the manufacturer. Nevertheless, the court found the
defendant-manufacturer liable.85 The courts have therefore been consis-
tent in holding that in the absence of statutes to the contrary a cause of
action in strict products liability accrues at the date of injury, and not
before, despite the seeming unfairness to defendants, particularly in suits
involving very old products.
III. PERPETUAL LIABILITY AND STATUTES OF REPOSE
A. The Products Liability Crisis
Because the statute of limitation in strict products liability actions begins
to run at the time of injury,86 a manufacturer may find itself subject to a
form of open-ended liability, especially with respect to longer-lasting prod-
ucts. 87 This perpetual liability may be further accentuated when the dis-
covery rule is applicable and the injury is cumulative or slow to develop. 88
Tolling provisions 89 and indemnity exceptions 90 to many statutes of limita-
tion may add even more years to a manufacturer's potential liability.91
This "long tail" problem 92 has led many manufacturers to declare that a
crisis now exists in the area of products liability.93
These manufacturers contend that current products liability law is
markedly consumer-biased. The litigation process itself, they say, is a pri-
mary factor in perpetuating this bias.94 For example, juries have undue
sympathy for severely injured plaintiffs, and the distribution of loss policy
ignores traditional notions of fault and ability to compensate injured con-
85. Id. at 177; see Nelson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120 (D.N.H. 1970)
(action against auto manufacturer for injuries sustained when auto overturned). The Nelson
court stated that the "'repose' of the manufacturer must give way to the welfare of the
consuming public [even if it meant] liability in perpetuity . 315 F. Supp. at 1122 (em-
phasis in original).
86. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Green v. Volkswagen of Am., 485 F.2d 430, 431 (6th Cir. 1973) (16-year-
old van); Wittkamp v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 1075, 1076-77 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (55-year-
old rifle); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914, 921 (1974)
(20-year-old crane).
88. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 169-70 for examples of these tolling provisions.
90. Nebraska's statute of repose, for example, does not affect the right of indemnity
from other persons. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(3) (Supp. 1982). Utah has tried to remedy
the potential indemnity problem by enacting a longer liability period for manufacturers than
retailers. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977). The UPLA also makes an indemnity excep-
tion. UPLA § I I0(B)(2)(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979).
91. See also Sherman, Legislative Responses to Judicial Activism in Strict Liability: Re-
form or Reaction?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359, 384 (1978).
92. Phillips, supra note 51, at 664; Twerski & Weinstein,,A Critique ofthe Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 244 (1978-1979).
93. See Johnson, Products Liability "Reform" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV.
677, 678 (1978) (manufacturer perception of crisis in products liability and concomitant dan-
ger this crisis poses to consumer); NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1977, at I1; Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1977,
at 36, col. 3; Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1976, at 4, cols. 1-2; Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1976, at 20, col. 4;
Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1977, at D-1, cols. 1-2.
94. Comment, supra note 8, at 166.
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sumers. Additionally, manufacturers point to the trend toward dispropor-
tionately large jury awards, a perceived relaxation of the plaintiffs burden
of proof, and liberalized rules of evidence. 95
Manufacturers contend that this trend may have devastating conse-
quences for both the manufacturer and the judicial process. 96 For exam-
ple, the increasing number and average dollar amount of products liability
claims and awards has led to a dramatic escalation in products liability
insurance premiums.97 This increase is due, in large part, to highly subjec-
tive methods of insurance rate-making.98 The judgments involved in set-
ting premiums have been distorted in recent years by the uncertainty
associated with products that have been in use for many years, 99 and have
caused many insurers to engage in "panic-pricing."' ° Unknown liability
for an equally unknown number of years has led to a worst-case type of
analysis. As a result, many insurers have either refused to issue products
liability policies altogether or have set premiums so high as to make them
effectively unavailable.' 0 '
In addition to the increased costs and uncertainty posed by open-ended
products liability, forcing the manufacturer to defend an action many
years after the product has left its hands creates additional burdens. Man-
ufacturers argue that the defense of products actions becomes exception-
ally difficult after a number of years has elapsed.' 0 2 Evidence necessary to
rebut proof of a product's defectiveness at the time it left the manufac-
turer's hands may have long since disappeared. Additionally, a product
may have been misused, altered, or modified during its life, causing an
initially safe product to become defective. Proving such defenses after a
substantial period of time may be nearly impossible. 0 3
95. Id.; see also Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS.
L.J. 213, 215.
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
97. Phillips, supra note 51, at 663; Comment, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a
Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 139-40 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Limiting Liability]; Comment, Alabama's Products Liability Statute of Repose, II CuM. L.
REV. 163, 165 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Alabama's Products].
98. For a discussion of the current insurance mechanism in products liability, see Com-
ment, Limiting Liability, supra note 97, at 141-42.
99. Id. at 141.
100. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment, and Business Opportuni-
ties of the Comm. on Small Business Product Liability Insurance, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 70-75
(1978) (analysis of insurance problem in products liability).
101. Comment, Limiting Liability, supra note 97, at 142. This uncertainty has had a neg-
ative impact on the ability of businesses to plan and price effectively. Id. at 139; McGovern,
supra note 5, at 593. An argument that weakens this contention, however, is the fact that a
manufacturer need only pass on the cost of liability insurance to the consumer. Thus, in-
stead of actually paying the increase in premiums, the manufacturer can marginally increase
the price of each product. The manufacturer is insured, and the consumer, the ultimate
beneficiary of the policy, foots the bill.
102. Herrington, Products Liability. Model Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43 J. AIR L.
& COM. 221, 224 (1977).
103. Herrington, supra note 102, at 224; McGovern, supra note 5, at 589.
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B. The Uniform Product Liability Act
In response to the conflicting views surrounding products liability,'°4 the
Economic Policy Board of the Executive Office of the President established
an Interagency Task Force to examine the present state of products liabil-
ity law.' 0 5 The Task Force found that the cost of products liability insur-
ance premiums had increased dramatically and that while the number of
claims involving older products did not justify this increase, the insurer's
apprehension about potential liability for older products, although exag-
gerated, was real. 1°6 This apprehension had caused both insurers and
manufacturers to engage in intensive lobbying efforts to remedy the cur-
rent situation. 0 7 The reform most sought after by manufacturers was the
establishment of a statute of repose for products actions. The Task Force's
Model Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA) incorporated a statute of
repose' 0 8 that would run from the date of manufacture or sale, creating a
limited time period within which any action arising out of the use of a
product, defective or otherwise, must be brought or be forever barred. 0 9
Supporters of the UPLA contend that statutes of repose establish an ac-
tuarially certain date from which potential liability can be calculated, en-
abling more accurate risk assessment and stabilizing insurance
premiums.' 10 Businesses can then set more realistic prices and plan more
effectively. In addition, proponents argue that a specific cut-off date for
filing suit would counterbalance the recent consumer bias of products lia-
bility, thus insuring fairness to manufacturers by eliminating those claims
for which evidence is difficult to produce."I' Finally, other proponents of
such statutes argue that if a product has been used without incident for a
number of years, this injury-free use should create the presumption that
the product was not defective at the time it was purchased or delivered. " 
2
104. For one commentator's view that the crisis has been fostered by manufacturers and
insurers in an attempt to avoid responsibility for their unsafe products, see Jamail, The Man-
ufactured Assault, TRIAL, Nov. 1979, at 24. See also Nader, The Corporate Assault on Prod-
ucts Liability: A Call to Action, TRIAL, Oct. 1977, at 38 (consumer-advocate's view of crisis).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCT LIABILITY
1-5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT].
106. Id. at VII-21. According to a survey published by the Insurance Services Office,
more than 97% of product injuries occur within six years of purchase. INS. SERV. OFFICE,
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY (1976).
107. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 105, at VII-21 to -34.
108. UPLA § I10(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979). The Task Force's model act,
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, is discussed infra notes 138-39 and accompanying
text.
109. See infra notes 140-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the variations of
these statutes in different states.
110. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,733 (1979) (analysis of Model Act and advantages of stat-
utes of repose).
I 11. The drafters of the UPLA reasoned that one of the advantages of incorporating a
statute of repose into the Model Act was to "eliminate tenuous claims involving older prod-
ucts for which evidence of defective conditions may be difficult to produce." 1d.; see also
supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the defense problems
manufacturers may encounter.
112. See V. WALKOWIAK, MATERIALS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY E-21 (3d ed. 1981);
Comment, Limiting Liability, supra note 97, at 143; Note, Various Risk Allocation Schemes
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Others counter such arguments by pointing to the fact that products liti-
gation after the passage of many years is just as difficult for the plaintiff as
for the manufacturer. 1 3 The injured party still must prove that the prod-
uct was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands, according to the
standards existent at the time of delivery, and that the injury was not the
result of misuse or normal wear and tear in the intervening years of use." 14
Further, opponents of a statute of repose point out that in most states evi-
dence of wear and tear, along with the age of a product, is admissible in
products actions to show nondefectiveness.1 5 The age of a product is usu-
ally examined in light of its expected useful life.' 16
In addition to a statute of repose, then, the concept of useful life has also
been codified in the UPLA. 117 This section provides that a manufacturer
is not liable for injury caused by his product if he proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the harm was caused after the product's useful
safe life had ended."' In determining whether this useful safe life has
expired, the fact-finder is to consider such factors as foreseeable wear and
tear, deterioration, manufacturer representations, and consumer modifica-
tion of the product. 19 The UPLA provides that useful safe life is an af-
firmative defense, accruing at the date of delivery. 120 If the alleged harm
occurred within the useful life of the product, a plaintiff is allowed two
years to bring suit from the date of injury or date of discovery of injury. 121
In focusing on common-law-like factors to determine safe life, the UPLA
provision recognizes as impractical any attempt to apply one safe life pe-
riod to all products. 122
C Shifting the Burden: Who Decides?
The enactment of a statute of repose, whether in the form of a rigid
limitation period or a flexible useful life concept, has the effect of shifting
the burden of loss to the consumer after the repose period has elapsed.
Such a result conflicts with the basic policy underlying products liabil-
Under the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. An Analysis ofthe Statute ofRepose," Com-
parative Fault Principles, and the Conflicting Social Policies Arising from Workplace Product
Inquiries, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 588, 598 (1980).
113. Johnson, supra note 93, at 691.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458, 459 (10th Cir. 1974) (manufactur-
ers not liable for negligent design of 24-year-old tractor); Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co.,
463 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1972) (no duty to furnish chain that would not wear out); Tucker
v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Or. 318, 473 P.2d 862, 862 (1970) ("prolonged use of a
manufactured article is but one factor, albeit an important one, in the determination of
whether a defect in the product made it unsafe .
116. V. WALKOWIAK, supra note 112, at E-21.
117. UPLA § I10(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979). The UPLA is only a model
code, and as yet no state has adopted it in whole. For an analysis of the model act, see
Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 92.
118. UPLA § I10(A), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. § 110(C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732 (statute of limitation).
122. 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,733.
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ity, 123 raising a critical issue: who is to determine when the shift should
occur?' 24 Some contend that such a decision is most fit for the judiciary,
since strict tort liability is in large part a judicial creation.' 25 In addition,
the flexibility of courts to adapt to individual cases and the equal footing
of the parties in the litigation process are reasons for leaving most aspects
of products actions, including risk of loss, to the judiciary. 126 Indeed, leg-
islatures have traditionally been deferential to the courts in matters of tort
reform.'2 7 Yet most courts bow to legislative pronouncements providing
for society's general welfare, assuming they are found reasonable and not
arbitrary. 128
Others argue that because legislatures have always had the power to pre-
scribe statutes of limitation, they, and not courts, are best suited to codify
statutes of repose. The Wisconsin Supreme Court took this view in Koz-
lowski v. John E Smith's Sons Co. ,129 holding that the general statute of
limitation, running from date of injury, applied to the product case before
it.' 30 The court recognized the problem of open-ended manufacturer lia-
bility, however, and recommended legislative review. 31 The court stated
that at the time the personal injury statute of limitation was enacted, the
legislature could not have contemplated its application to products thirty-
five years after manufacture. 32 The court thus proposed a statute of re-
pose running from date of manufacture. 33 The court refused to impose
such a standard, however, emphasizing that the complexity involved in
products liability law required extensive hearings and debates proper to
the legislative process. 134
A further problem is whether federal or state government would be most
effective in implementing these proposed reforms. ' 35 Those urging federal
123. See Owen, supra note 48 (shift away from traditional answers and policies attending
products liability).
124. McGovern, supra note 5, at 592.
125. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 899, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 699 (1962); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (1965); Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
126. See McGovern, supra note 5, at 597.
127. Id.
128. For an example of the judiciary's traditional deference to the legislature in matters
pertaining to the general welfare, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976), where the Supreme Court stated that the judiciary would not "judge the wisdom...
of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor
[suspect classes]."
129. 87 Wis. 2d 882, 275 N.W.2d 915 (1979).




134. Id. at 925; see also Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522,
525 (1981). The Thornton court, in construing the state's statute of repose as a valid exercise
of the legislature's police power, stated: "Whether this particular statute is the best means of
achieving the desired goal of the legislature is not, of course, a proper subject of judicial
inquiry." 425 N.E.2d at 525. For a discussion of the relative advantages of allowing the
legislature, rather than the courts, to impose periods of ultimate repose, see McGovern,
supra note 51, at 431-33; McGovern, supra note 5, at 592-98.
135. The Interagency Task Force recognized the effect of products liability law on inter-
1983]
SO UTHWESTERN LA4W JOURNAL
implementation argue that since products liability actions usually involve
interstate transactions, state-by-state enactment would raise difficult con-
flicts of law questions that could be avoided by a uniform act. 136 Addi-
tionally, individual state enactment would do little to ease the
manufacturer's insurance crisis since product liability premiums are often
calculated on a nationwide basis.137 The Interagency Task Force proposed
the UPLA in light of these concerns, 38 but products problems vary to such
a degree from state to state that legislative reform has traditionally been
thought best left to each state. 139
D. State Legislative Responses
Because the difficulties associated with products liability law vary from
state to state, the statutes of repose enacted in response to those problems
also vary from state to state.' 40 The principal variations among the stat-
utes concern what theories of recovery are covered, whether the statute
operates as a complete bar to recovery, when the period of limitation com-
mences to run, and what exceptions, if any, are allowed to mitigate the
sometimes harsh effect of the statutes. There are currently twenty-one
products liability statutes of repose, ranging in length from five to twelve
years.141 Several states have drafted general statutes of repose applicable
state commerce and recommended that any widespread products liability reform be imple-
mented at the federal level. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 105, at VII-19
to -20. This would increase uniformity, avoid conflicts between the states, and reduce insur-
ance premiums. 1d. at VII-20.
136. See supra note 9.
137. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 105, at VII-21 to -23. For a discus-
sion of the impact the state character of products actions has on the insurance mechanism,
see McGovern, supra note 5, at 595; Phillips, supra note 5 1, at 672; Comment, Limiting Lia-
biiy, supra note 97, at 18 1.
138. Congress derives the authority to enact a federal products statute from U.S. CONST.
art. i, § 8, cl. 3, which authorizes Congress to "regulate commerce ... among the several
States." Section 103 of the UPLA provides that adoption of the model act will preempt "all
existing law governing matters within its coverage, including the 'Uniform Commercial
Code' and similar laws." UPLA § 103, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,720. Several federal products
liability statutes now exist: 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1976) (black lung disease); id. § 2210 (nu-
clear incidents); id. § 2476 (swine flu). In 1977 a bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the
Senate providing for a 10-year federal products liability statute of limitation. S. 403, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
139. Critics of the UPLA argue that codifying all products liability law into one act is a
"mammoth if not impossible task." 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
§ 16D.01 (1982).
140. Products liability statutes are fairly recent creations; most have been enacted within
the last five years. The first products liability statute of repose was enacted by Utah in 1977.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977). The most recently enacted is that of Washington.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1983-1984).
141. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-277a (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO
CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, $ 13-213 (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp.
1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303
(Supp. 1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
224 (Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6)
(Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1)
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
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to all products actions.142 Others have adopted specific statutes applicable
to particular products. 143 Most statutes of repose apply to all causes of
action based on personal or property injury, regardless of the legal theory
being pled,' 44 while other statutes specifically exclude actions based on
breach of express warranty or intentional misrepresentation from their
coverage. ' 45
One suggested method of curbing the inequities associated with statutes
of repose is to exclude actions based on negligence from their coverage. ' 46
In this way a plaintiff retains a cause of action in negligence, even if a
warranty or strict liability action is barred, subject, however, to the difficult
burden of proving lack of due care at the time of manufacture. This
method avoids the inherent inequity of completely barring a plaintiff from
a remedy before he is injured. Yet the majority of statutes of repose do
just that by prescribing an absolute bar to recovery, 147 or by creating an
irrebuttable presumption that a product is nondefective if a certain period
of time has passed since its manufacture. 14 This presumption is based on
a legislative conclusion that the useful safe life of all products is, or should
be, identical. 14 9
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1983-1984). The UPLA sets out a 10-year statute of
repose in § I 10(B). UPLA § 110(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732. Its drafters contend that such
time is an adequate safeguard for consumers as it is in excess of the time allowed in most
states. V. WALKOWIAK, supra note 112, at E-22.
142. States with general statutes of repose are Connecticut, Kansas, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and Oregon.
143. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-243 (1979) (ionizing radiation injury); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-103(b) (1980) (asbestos).
144. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127.5(1) (Supp. 1982) (statute will apply "re-
gardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which action is brought"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(1) (Supp. 1981) (statute will apply to any action based on
"IbIreach of any implied warranties," "[d]efects in design, inspection, testing, or manufac-
ture," "[flailure to warn," and "[flailure to properly instruct in the use of a product"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1981) (includes actions based on design, inspection, testing, and
like).
145. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982) (specifically excluding actions
based on breach of express warranty); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(d) (1981) (exempting
"any action against a product seller who intentionally misrepresents a product or fraudu-
lently conceals information about it").
146. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); see also lAerrington, supra note
102, at 224 (view that this reform would remedy much of injustice associated with repose
statutes).
147. See supra note 141 (statutes of Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Utah).
148. Statutes that create this presumption may encounter some constitutional problems
in light of the United States Supreme Court's irrebuttable presumption doctrine. See Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating school board's irrebuttable
presumption that teachers over five months pregnant were physically unable to perform
their duties). In evaluating such irrebuttable presumptions a court must inquire whether the
state has any compelling interest in fixing a definite period of time for all products and in
not allowing an aggrieved person to present evidence overcoming the presumption.
149. See Note, supra note 9, at 149-51 (irrebuttable presumption doctrine in context of
statutes of repose). Statutes of repose containing such irrebuttable presumptions are likely
to fail constitutional analysis if, like Lafleur, "the riht to present evidence rebutting the
conclusive presumption prevails over notions of administrative convenience." Id. at 15 1.
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In recognition of the vast number of products on the market with vary-
ing useful lives, some states have enacted repose statutes that raise only a
rebuttable presumption. These statutes provide that a product's useful life
is presumed to expire after a certain number of years,'50 or that after a
certain number of years without incident, a product is presumed to be non-
effective. 51 The plaintiff, however, is allowed to rebut the presumption by
introducing evidence of defectiveness despite expiration of the limitation
period. 5 2 Rebuttability does not, however, remedy all the inequities asso-
ciated with statutes of repose.' 53 Presumptions are meant to bring to light
evidence in the control of one of the parties, or further a social policy by
favoring one party over another. 54 In products actions the manufacturer
is the one with control of much of the evidence needed to prove defective-
ness. Allowing the presumption to favor the manufacturer is contrary to
the basic risk-shifting policy of products liability since the presumption
may increase an injured plaintiffs burden of proof and thus bar the plain-
tiff's claim as effectively as would an irrebuttable presumption. 55
In their various forms state statutes of repose provide for several possi-
ble accrual dates.' 56 A statute may commence at date of sale for use or
consumption, 57 or run from the date the defendant parted with possession
and control. 158 Two different limitation periods, running from date of sale
and date of manufacture, may be incorporated into a single repose stat-
ute.1-9 Finally, a statute of repose may commence at the date of delivery
150. For example, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1983-1984) establishes that
a product is rebuttably presumed useful for 12 years, and IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp.
1982) provides for a 10-year useful safe life rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.
The UPLA creates a similar rebuttable presumption by providing that if harm from a prod-
uct occurs more than 10 years after delivery, "a presumption arises that the harm was caused
after the useful safe life had expired." UPLA § 110(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732. Plaintiffs
can rebut this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
151. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin Supp. 1982) (useful safe life
presumed to be five years after sale and eight years after manufacture).
152. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1982) (clear and convincing evidence re-
quired to rebut presumption); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin Supp. 1982) (pre-
sumption rebutted by preponderance of the evidence).
153. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 38 (discussion of use and purpose of
presumptions).
154. Id.
155. Cf. Bivins, The Product Liability Crisis: Modest Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, II
AKRON L. REV. 595, 614 (1978) (rebuttable presumption avoids inequity of absolute bar, but
doubtful aid to defendant).
156. See supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of accrual dates of
traditional statutes of limitation in products liability actions.
157. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982) ("twelve years after the product
was first sold for use or consumption"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(2) (Supp. 1982) (10 years
after date product was "first sold or leased for use or consumption"). Other states having
statutes of repose running from this date include Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See supra note
141.
158. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-277a(a) ("ten years from the date that such party
last parted with possession or control of the product").
159. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 411.310(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1981) ("five (5) years after the
date of sale to the first consumer or more than eight (8) years after the date of manufac-
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to the original purchaser. 60 A grace period may also be provided so that
if the harm occurs near the end of the repose period, the injured claimant
has a number of years, usually two, beyond the repose period in which to
bring suit.' 6
The trigger date for these statutes, however, is not as important as their
effect in combination with tort statutes of limitation. The most common
type of repose statute is one that works in conjunction with the traditional
tort statute of limitation applicable to strict liability actions. The statute
usually provides that a products liability action will be barred if not
brought within a certain number of years from the date of injury, or dis-
covery of injury, but in no event shall the action be brought later than the
specified repose period, regardless of when the defect manifests itself or the
injury is discovered. 162 Such a statute has the potential of barring a plain-
tiff from suit before his injury occurs. The injustice of such a law is magni-
fied when applied to products with unlimited shelf lives' 63 or to durable
goods whose defects do not manifest themselves until after many years of
continuous use.I 64 Other statutes of repose run from date of injury and
contain no outer limit on liability. 165 This type of statute is nearly identi-
cal to traditional tort statutes of limitation, complete with discovery provi-
sions, except that it is tailored to products actions. While such date-of-
injury statutes give maximum protection to the consumer, they do not
speak to the manufacturers' concerns.
ture"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (no more than six years after date of initial
purchase or 10 years after date of manufacture).
160. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (Supp. 1982) (presumption arises when harm
caused "more than ten (10) years after the time of delivery"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1982) (more than six years after "date of the delivery of the completed
product to its first purchaser or lessee"). The UPLA's statute of repose runs from the time of
delivery to the first purchaser or lessee not engaged in the business of selling such products
or using them as component parts of another product to be sold. UPLA § I 10(A)(I), 44 Fed.
Reg. at 62,732. Florida, Indiana, Kansas, and Washington also start their statutory period at
date of delivery. See supra note 141.
161. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1982) ("if the cause of action accrues
more than eight [8] years but not more than ten [10] years after that initial delivery, the
action may be commenced at any time within two [2] years after the cause of action ac-
crues."). Thus, the longest period in which an action could be brought in Indiana is 12
years. Id.
162. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982) (no later than two years after
injury, but no later than 12 years after first purchase for use or consumption); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979) (within three years of injury or discovery of injury, but
no later than 12 years after manufacturer parted with possession or control).
163. See, e.g., Filler v. Raytex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970) (eyeglasses); Sweeney
v. Max A.R. Mathews & Co., 46 Ill. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970) (concrete nails); Hogenson
v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wash. 2d 209, 461 P.2d 311 (1969) (ammunition).
164. One commentator has remarked that since statutes of repose make no distinction
between durable and consumer goods, their effect is particularly harsh in the workplace
context, where a worker who has little opportunity to select the machinery may be injured
many years after its purchase. Comment, Alabama's Products, supra note 97, at 18 1.
165. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05, subd. 2 (West Supp. 1983) (requiring that any
strict products liability action be brought within four years of date of injury); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-2803 (Supp. 1981) (providing that all products liability actions be brought within
three years of date of "death, injury or damage"); see also 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 41, § 3D-12 (discussion of these statutes).
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Many states have attempted to reach a middle ground between these two
extremes by incorporating various exceptions into their statutes of repose.
These exceptions are designed to mitigate the harshness of an absolute cap
on liability by giving an injured plaintiff additional time within which to
bring suit. 166 Some statutes provide that a manufacturer may expressly
waive or extend the statutory period, 167 while another prohibits manufac-
turers from limiting the statute's operation by agreement. 168 While many
products liability statutes of repose fail to make any exception for age mi-
nority or disability, 169 others provide for the tolling of the statute until
majority is reached or the disability removed. 70 Most statutes of repose
also exempt from their operation actions based on a manufacturer's fraud-
ulent concealment, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation. 17' Finally,
many states have enacted special statutes of repose that exclude those inju-
ries caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product, or those injuries
that are not reasonably discoverable until after the repose period has
elapsed. 172
E. Constitutionality
Products liability statutes of repose are frequently challenged on consti-
tutional grounds, the most common of which are equal protection, due
process, and right of access to the courts. 173 Equal protection challenges
166. See generally Phillips, supra note 51, for a discussion of these various exceptions to
statutes of repose.
167. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(d) (Supp. 1982) (seller may waive or extend period
of time); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 13-213(b) (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1983-1984) (unless
defendant expressly warranted product for longer period of time); UPLA § 1 10B(2)(a), 44
Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
168. See GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(3) (Supp. 1982) ("A manufacturer may not ex-
clude or limit the operation ....").
169. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums Supp. 1982) ("to all persons regard-
less of minority or legal disability"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(2) (Supp. 1981) ("re-
gardless of minority or other legal disability"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(2) (1977)
("regardless of minority or other legal disability"); see also Delay v. Marathon LeTourreau
Sales & Serv. Co., 48 Or. App. 811, 618 P.2d 11, 13 (1980) (Oregon's statutes not tolled by
plaintiff's insanity).
170. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-80-127.5(2) (Supp. 1982) (if under 18 years, men-
tally incompetent, imprisoned, or absent from United States at time cause of action accrues);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 9 13-213(d) (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1983-1984) (under 18, insane,
or imprisoned on criminal charges); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980) (minor must
bring suit within one year after majority).
171. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2(IV) (Supp. 1979) (does not apply to
actions based on defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations, concealment, or nondisclosure);
UPLA § I 10(B)(2)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(b) (Supp. 1982) (latent injury, toxic or harmful in-
jury producing substance over a period of time); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2)(b)(4) (Supp. 1982)
(prolonged exposure to defective or injury-causing aspect of product not discovered); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1980) (exposure to asbestos). The UPLA has a similar provision
designed for those situations when a product contains a hidden defect at the time of delivery,
that is not discoverable by a reasonably prudent person, and that does not manifest itself
until after the expiration of the statute. UPLA § I I0(B)(2)(d), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
173. McGovern, supra note 5, at 604. A state court may subject statutes of repose to




under either state or federal constitutions usually focus on the statute's
dissimilar treatment of a class of plaintiffs, a class of defendants, or a class
of regulated subject matter. 174 When reviewing a statute of repose for
equal protection purposes, a court will generally look to see if the statute
rests on a rational basis.17 5 The court must determine whether the classifi-
cation is a reasonable means of achieving a proper legislative objective,
and whether all class members within the classification are treated
uniformly. 176
Two cases involving equal protection challenges to products liability
statutes of repose are Thornton v. Mono Manufacturing Co. 177 and Dague v.
Pper Aircraft Corp. 178 In Thornton Illinois's ten-year-after-sale statute of
repose was claimed violative of equal protection because it applied only to
strict liability actions and not to actions based on implied warranty or neg-
ligence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the statute's constitutional-
ity, holding that the classification created by the statute was rational in
view of the independence of a strict liability cause of action from the tradi-
tional constraints applicable to the other two actions. 179 In Dague Indi-
ana's ten-year-after-delivery statute similarly withstood the plaintiffs
claim that it singled out manufacturers of older products for special pro-
tection over manufacturers of new ones. The federal district court found
that the repose statute served a public purpose by holding down insurance
costs and thus created a source of funds for plaintiff recovery. 180 The court
suggested that the statute actually benefitted plaintiffs by assisting in stabi-
lizing damage potential.181 Statutes of repose are thus given a strong pre-
sumption of validity if some proper legislative purpose is found.
Due process 182 protects rights and remedies that have already vested by
requiring that a plaintiff be given a sufficient amount of time within which
to bring his claim once a cause of action accrues. 183 The United States
Supreme Court has held, however, that legislatures may create new rights
for potential plaintiffs and may also abolish rights previously recognized at
174. See Massery, supra note 3, at 545 (happenstance of date of sale creates classification
between two similarly situated manufacturers); Comment, Alabama's Products, supra note
97, at 180 (arbitrary distinction between those injured immediately prior and subsequent to
termination of period); Note, supra note 9, at 149 (improbable that statutes will fall to equal
protection analysis if wording of statute includes "all product liability type actions").
175. See Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 216 (1978) (upholding
restrictions of G.I. Bill's veteran's educational assistance program); County Bd. v. Richards,
434 U.S. 5, 7 (1977) (upholding Virginia zoning ordinance).
176. Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tenn. 1978) (medical malpractice stat-
ute of repose upheld under equal protection scrutiny); see also McGovern, supra note 5, at
606-10 (discussion of subtleties of equal protection analysis for statutes of repose).
177. 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
178. 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
179. 425 N.E.2d at 524.
180. 513 F. Supp. at 25.
181. Id.
182. The right to equal protection and due process is guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
183. For due process cases dealing with an individual's right to sue, see Wilson v. Isem-
inger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 615 (1977).
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common law without violating the due process guarantee. 84 Legislatures
may also prospectively limit the time within which actions may be brought
and modify existing periods as to claims that have not yet vested. '85 These
existing periods may be shortened or lengthened so long as a reasonable
time to file suit is provided. 186
A statute of repose is usually attacked as violative of due process on the
ground that it takes away a plaintiffs vested right to bring an action before
the right to assert the claim arises. 187 In addressing a due process chal-
lenge to Illinois's repose statute, the Thorton court concluded that instead
of depriving a plaintiff of a vested right, the statute prevented a potential
cause of action from ever arising. 8 8 The statute in Thornton was held to
preclude a minor's action for injuries received from a rotary cutter
machine. 89 The court rejected plaintiffs argument that the statute, which
did not provide for tolling for minors, violated the minor's right to due
process. 190 The court found that the policy behind tolling a statute of limi-
tation for minors was to ensure that their rights would not be extinguished
because of their age disability.' 9' The court concluded that the statute of
repose extinguished the cause of action before it arose, regardless of
whether the holder of that cause was a child or an adult. 92 The statute
was therefore held constitutional. 93
The plaintiff's constitutional argument in Dague v. Piper Aircraft
Corp. '94 similarly failed when the Indiana Supreme Court upheld Indi-
ana's statute of repose. The court initially recognized the strong presump-
tion of constitutionality given to legislative acts.' 95 Since the plaintiff's
cause of action did not accrue until the date of injury, which injury oc-
curred after the limitation period had run, the court concluded that no
cause of action existed at the time the plaintiff allegedly suffered dam-
ages. 196 Indiana's statute of repose therefore did not run afoul of due
process. 197
An injured consumer appears more likely to succeed in challenging the
184. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1929).
185. Comment, supra note 1, at 1190. Of course, such legislation must still withstand
constitutional scrutiny if challenged. Id. at 1186-90.
186. See id. at 1190.
187. For cases upholding state statutes of repose on due process grounds, see Thornton v.
Mono Mfg. Co., 99 I11. App. 3d 772, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981); Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974).
188. 425 N.E.2d at 525.
189. Id. at 527.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. The court stated that the purpose of "dampen[ing] the rapid escalation of insur-
ance rates which has accompanied widened exposure to lawsuits" was reasonably related to
the 10-year period. Id. at 524.
193. Id. at 527.
194. 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981).
195. Id. at 213.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53, 57 (1974) (Oregon
statute of repose found constitutional under due process attack).
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constitutionality of a statute of repose by invoking a provision found in
many state constitutions, the open court clause.' 98 This provision gener-
ally provides that a plaintiff cannot be denied access to the courts of his
state.' 99 Construed broadly, such a provision may be read as prohibiting
or severely limiting legislative abolition of common law rights. In Battilla
v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 200 the Florida Supreme Court struck
down Florida's products liability statute of repose as denying a plaintiffs
access to the courts. 20' The court relied on the reasoning in Overland Con-
struction Co. v. Sirmons, 202 in which Florida's statute of repose for archi-
tects had been struck down. 20 3 The Overland court held that the
architectural statute abolished a common law right to sue without provid-
ing an alternative remedy. 2°4 Because the state had failed to show an
"overpowering public necessity" or an "absence of less onerous alterna-
tives," the statute was ruled unconstitutional. 20 5 The Overland court im-
plied that if the legislature had demonstrated the availability of alternative
forms of redress, the statute might have been upheld.20 6 Construed nar-
rowly, however, open court provisions may be interpreted as merely enun-
ciating a general philosophical guideline for the state, rather than granting
a substantive right of access. 20 7
IV. THE CASE FOR A PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF
REPOSE IN TEXAS
A. Products Liability in Texas
The Texas Supreme Court stated the basic rule of products liability in
198. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. i, § 21. Florida's open court provision reads: "The
courts shall be open to every person for redress of any inju.ry, and justice shall be adminis-
tered without sale, denial or delay." Id.; see also ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CONN. CONST.
art. 1, § 10; WiS. CONST. art. 1, § 9. The federal Constitution contains no counterpart to this
clause.
199. For a discussion of such remedy clauses and their impact on the constitutionality of
statutes of repose, see McGovern, supra note 5, at 617; Comment, Alabama's Products, supra
note 97, at 172-80.
200. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1981).
201. Id. at 874.
202. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
203. Id. at 575. The statute provided that no action based on the design, planning, or
construction of an improvement to realty could be brought against a professional engineer,
registered architect, or licensed contractor after 12 years after completion. 1d. at 572. Many
other states have similar architectural statutes of repose, the constitutionality of which has
been tested many times. See McGovern, supra note 51, at 427-28, for a discussion of these
statutes. Courts are not, however, uniform as to their rulings of constitutionality.
204. 369 So. 2d at 574-75.
205. Id. at 574. The court stated that the passage of time imposed heavy proof burdens
on all litigants, and thus the statute benefitted "one class of defendants, at the expense of an
injured party's right to sue . Id. at 575.
206. Id. at 574.
207. See Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 I11. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522, 526 (1981)
(remedy provision in Illinois constitution is philosophy rather than mandate; court refused
to follow Overland). These remedy clauses may also be construed as binding only on the
judiciary, rather than on the legislature, or as prohibiting the abolition of vested rights only,
not those not yet accrued. See McGovern, supra note 5, at 616; Comment, Alabama's Prod-
ucts, supra note 97, at 173.
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Texas in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products,208 holding that
"[olne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property .... -209 Products liability law in Texas, as stated in Signal Oil,
is largely a matter of judicial creation and has developed from the initial
imposition of implied warranty as a matter of public policy 210 to a judicial
adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts21' and the
abolition of the privity requirement in warranty actions.212 Today, Texas
consumers find remedies for products injuries in section 402A and the
Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code.213 As in other jurisdic-
tions, products liability actions in Texas can be predicated upon any of the
three basic products liability theories.
B. Statutes of Limitation in Texas
The application of Texas statutes of limitation varies depending on the
theory under which a products claim is brought.214 In general a Texas
statute of limitation begins to run when a cause of action accrues. If the
cause of action sounds in negligence, accrual usually occurs at the time the
tort is committed even though damages are not immediately apparent. 215
In Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc. 216 the court of civil ap-
peals refused to depart from the rule that statutes of limitation run from
the time of commission of the negligent act, and not from the time the
injuries are ascertained. 217 Thus, the plaintiff was barred from recovery
though most of his damages occurred after the expiration of the statute. 218
208. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
209. Id. at 325 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)) (emphasis
added by court).
210. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (im-
plied warranty in food case).
211. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1967) (specifically
adopting § 402A).
212. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977).
213. Signal Oil, 572 S.W.2d at 326-27; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.312-318
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
214. Texas courts have generally held that the primary purpose of a statute of limitation
is to compel the assertion of claims within a reasonable time and thereby afford the opposing
party a fair opportunity to defend while the evidence is fresh and witnesses are available.
Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977) (citing Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522
S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. 1975); Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471, 478, 226 S.W.2d 816, 820
(Tex. 1950)).
215. Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. 1967); Lyles v. Johnson, 585 S.W.2d
778, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. 470 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
217. Id. at 98-99.
218. Id. at 99; see also Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("In actions for negligence, the period of limitations begins to run from the com-
mission of the negligent act, not the date of the ascertainment of damages."); Robinson v.
Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. 1977) (cause of action accrues when wrongful act effects an
injury, regardless of when plaintiff learned of this injury). The statute of limitation applica-
ble to negligence actions is the two-year statute set out in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5526 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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The same two-year statute of limitation applicable to negligence actions
applies to strict products liability in tort. 219 In strict liability actions, how-
ever, this limitation period begins to run when injury is discovered, or
should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 220
The four-year limitation period of the Uniform Commercial Code is ap-
plicable to products actions based solely on implied warranty. 22' In the
1980 case of Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc. 222 the Texas Supreme Court
held that the adoption of section 402A did not repeal the remedies and
limitations available under the Texas UCC, and thus the UCC's four-year
statute of limitation applied to a personal injury suit brought in war-
ranty.223 This was so despite the difficulty of bringing personal injury ac-
tions under the Texas UCC.224 Unlike negligence actions, however, the
statute of limitation for breach of warranty actions begins to run when the
plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, his injury. 225 Hence the discovery rule, while generally not
applicable in negligence, is applicable in strict products liability in tort and
in warranty.
219. Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1975) (products liability
action brought against drug manufacturer five years after consumer first learned of injury);
Cleveland v. Square-D Co., 613 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ) (§ 402A action governed by two-year statute of limitation).
220. See Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1981) (lim-
itation period in products liability actions commences when "buyer discovers, or in exercise
of ordinary care should have discovered injury"); Borel v. Fireboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973) (cause of action in asbestos case does not accrue until
injury manifests itself), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Thrift v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381
F. Supp. 543, 545 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (where disease caused by drug manufactured by defend-
ant did not appear until 23 years after it was administered, statute of limitation ran upon
discovery of nature and cause of injuries); cf. Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 972
(5th Cir. 1975) (action not filed until five years after plaintiff was advised by physician that
her problems probably resulted from adverse drug reaction barred).
221. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
222. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980) (suit for sulphur burns against manufacturer of
container).
223. Id. at 462; see also Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7, 10-11
(S.D. Tex. 1976) (claims based on warranty for explosion of propane truck governed by
four-year Texas UCC statute of limitation); Cleveland v. Square-D Co., 613 S.W.2d 790, 791
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (four-year statute of limitation set out
in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) applied in implied
warranty action).
224. The Garcia court cited Code provisions regarding elements of proof, causation, dis-
claimer, and notice as possible difficulties involved in applying the UCC. 610 S.W.2d at 461;
see also Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412, 425-26 (1972) (Code provi-
sions regarding consequential damages, notice, and disclaimer classified as "too much lug-
gage"); Pearson v. Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 138-39 (S.D. 1977) (notice,
disclaimer, and privity requirements of UCC distinguish warranty from strict liability).
225. See Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7, It (S.D. Tex. 1976)
(discovery rule in warranty actions unchanged by enactment of UCC); Metal Structures
Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (period of limitation commences not at sale, but when buyer discovers, or should have
discovered, injury); see also Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, Inc., 351 S.W.2d
119, 122-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
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C Statutes of Repose in Texas
Texas currently has no products liability statute of repose. Texas does,
however, have both an architects' statute of repose2 26 and a medical mal-
practice statute of repose,227 both of which have been subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny by the Texas courts. Although the Texas Constitution
prohibits the divesting of rights that have completely vested,22 8 statutes of
repose have withstood this ban on retroactive effect by being interpreted as
affecting remedies or procedures rather than substantive rights.229 Practi-
cally, however, such statutes do have a substantive effect because they
abolish a plaintiff's cause of action without affording him an alternate
means of relief.
The Texas architects' statute of repose bars any claim not brought
within ten years of substantial completion against any registered, licensed
architect furnishing the design, inspection, or construction of any improve-
ment or structure.2 30 Like the malpractice statute, it has the potential ef-
fect of completely cutting off an injured plaintiffs cause of action before it
arises. The statute does allow for a two-year grace period, 231 however, and
does not apply when a written warranty guarantees an improvement for
more than ten years, when the action is against the person in actual posses-
sion, or when it is based on willful misconduct or fraudulent conceal-
ment.2 32 Thus, even if a manufacturer is insulated from liability ten years
after substantial completion, the owner or lessor of the building is not pro-
tected from negligence suits under this statute. The constitutionality of the
statute was upheld in the face of equal protection and due process chal-
lenges in Hill v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc. 233 In Hill the widows of men as-
phyxiated by inhalation of sewage gases brought suit against the engineers
who designed the sewage treatment plant, but were barred by the stat-
ute.234 In upholding the statute's constitutionality the court of appeals re-
lied on the strong presumption that the legislature understood and
correctly appreciated the needs of its own people.235 The Hill court found
that curative or remedial legislation, such as the statute at issue, should be
given the most liberal constitutional construction possible.2 36
In construing the architectural statute the Hill court also held that the
statute was not tolled because of the plaintiffs minority, and that it was not
226. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
227. Id. art. 4590i, § 10.01.
228. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
229. Doran v. Compton, 645 F.2d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 1981).
230. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 555 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Id. at 150.
235. Id. at 149 (citing Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1968)).
236. 555 S.W.2d at 149; see also Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reaffirming constitutionality of archi-
tects' statute of repose).
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improper to give the statute retroactive effect.237 While statutes of limita-
tion will normally not run against minors until they reach majority,238 this
rule was held inapplicable in Hill, since at the time the minor brought suit
the statute had extinguished her claim and she had no cause of action to
which the tolling statute could be applied. 239 Although the statute did not
become effective until after the wrong was committed, the Hill court found
that the statute could properly be given retroactive effect because "mere
retroactivity" was not sufficient to void a statute. 240 As long as the plain-
tiffs were afforded a reasonable time to protect their interest, the statute
would stand. 241
The statute of limitation contained in the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act provides that no health care liability claim may be
brought unless filed within two years of the occurrence of the breach or
tort or from the date on which the medical or health care treatment was
completed.242 The single exception to this bar states that minors under the
age of twelve have until age fourteen to file suit or have the claim filed on
their behalf.24 3 Otherwise, the bar applies to "all persons regardless of
minority or other legal disability."' 244 This statute abolishes the prior com-
mon law rule that in medical malpractice cases the statute of limitation
runs from the date the malpractice was or should have been discovered. 245
In the findings and purposes section of the statute the legislature evidenced
its concern with what it deemed to be a medical malpractice crisis existing
in Texas. 246 The validity of this legislative concern was affirmed in Little-
field v. Hays,247 in which the court of civil appeals found that it was well
within the legislature's power to "set an absolute time beyond which the
insurer has no exposure. ' 248 The court upheld the Act's constitutionality
on both equal protection and open court grounds, finding that the statute
had a fair and substantial relation to the objective of meeting the insurance
crisis and that it was proper for the legislature to focus on this group of
237. 555 S.W.2d at 150.
238. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This provision
also tolls statutes of limitation for persons imprisoned or of unsound mind. Id.; see also
McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. 1972) (common law tolling of statute
in absence of statute so providing).
239. 555 S.W.2d at 150; see also Mahathy v. George L. Ingram & Assocs., 584 S.W.2d
521, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (minor's action against architect for
injuries sustained when she cut her arm on glass door barred).
240. 555 S.W.2d at 150 (quoting Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642
(Tex. 1979)).
241. 555 S.W.2d at 150.
242. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1973). The Hays court, in applying the
discovery rule, recognized that if the statute ran from the date of operation, the patient's
legal remedy might be barred before the injury was discovered. "A result so absurd and so
unjust ought not to be possible." Id.; see also Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex.
1977) (discovery rule applicable in medical malpractice suit prior to Liability Act's passage).
246. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
247. 609 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
248. Id. at 630.
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health care providers because their problems differed from those of other
insureds.249 While recognizing that the statute effectively abolished the
discovery rule, the court found that such abolition was not of sufficient
constitutional dimensions to invalidate the law.
250
In the recent case of Sax v. Votteler,251 however, the Texas Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of section 4 of article 5.82 of the
Texas Insurance Code, the forerunner of the medical malpractice stat-
ute.252 This section provided for a two-year statute of limitation running
from the date of breach, tort, or completion of medical treatment. Its pro-
vision for minors, however, was less liberal than that contained in the
Medical Liability Act, providing that minors under the age of six had until
their eighth birthday to file their claim. 253 The supreme court in Sax held
article 5.82 unconstitutional as it applied to a minor's cause of action.
254
While recognizing that the article's purpose of establishing standards for
setting health care liability insurance rates was reasonable, and that a con-
nection existed between the length of an insured's potential liability and
such rates, the court found the legislature's means of achieving this pur-
pose unreasonable. 255 Relying exclusively on the open court provision of
the Texas Constitution,256 the court held the statute of limitation in this
section of the Insurance Code unconstitutional when "weighed against the
effective abrogation of a child's right to redress," and in light of the fact
that the legislature had failed to provide "any adequate substitute to ob-
tain redress for. . injuries. ' 257 The court was careful, however, to limit
its holding to the statute as it applied to minors.258 In finding the minor's
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
252. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865-66, repealed by
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, 1977, ch. 817, Part 1, 1977 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2039. The Professional Liability Insurance for Physicians, Podiatrists, and Hospitals
Act amended chapter 5 of the Insurance Code by adding article 5.82, § 4 of which provided:
Notwithstanding any other law, no claim against a person or hospital covered
by a policy of professional liability insurance covering a person licensed to
practice medicine or podiatry or certified to administer anesthesia in this state
or a hospital licensed under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law, as amended
(Art. 4437f, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), whether for breach of express or
implied contract or tort, for compensation for a medical treatment or hospital-
ization may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years of the
breach or the tort complained of or from the date the medical treatment that is
the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is
completed, except that minors under the age of six years shall have until their
eighth birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, such claim. Ex-
cept as herein provided, this section applies to all persons regardless of minor-
ity or other legal disability.
Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865-66.
253. Id.
254. 648 S.W.2d at 667.
255. Id.
256. Id. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law."




parents barred by the statute, the court impliedly upheld the act as applied
to adults. 259
D. Proposal For Texas Legislative Change
Texas has no specific products liability statutes of limitation or re-
pose.260 In recent years, however, the Texas Legislature has considered
proposals seeking to impose a time limit on suits for injuries arising out of
the use of defective products. 26' Because these proposals have also in-
cluded other controversial product reforms, they have failed to pass.262
Given the favorable judicial treatment accorded the medical malpractice
and architects' statutes of repose, however, Texas law appears receptive to
legislative enactments capping a defendant's potentially unlimited liabil-
ity, if such acts are based on rational policy grounds and make exception
for minors. Any products liability legislation passed by the Texas Legisla-
ture, therefore, will probably contain a repose provision if the products
liability "crisis," like the medical malpractice "crisis," is perceived as real.
The Texas Legislature, however, should not enact a products liability
statute of repose without careful consideration. Care should be taken to
strike a balance between protection of the manufacturer from infinite lia-
bility and protection of the often innocent plaintiff from injury caused by
defective products. The statute should afford the plaintiff a reasonable
amount of time to discover his injury. 263 Perhaps the statute could be lim-
ited to actions brought in strict liability and implied warranty. In this way
the consumer would still be able to proceed on a negligence theory, subject
to the difficult requirement of proving unreasonable conduct. Strict prod-
ucts liability, however, was developed to overcome the difficulty of proving
a manufacturer negligent,264 and thus a statute with such an exception
would still seem to be contrary to the spirit of strict products liability. An-
other way to avoid cutting off completely a plaintiffs action would be to
make the presumption created by the repose statute a rebuttable one that
could be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. Imposing on the
plaintiff the additional burden of overcoming a presumption may be un-
reasonable, however, in light of the difficulties associated with proving a
product defective after a long period of time.
In striking this balance between manufacturer and consumer the Texas
Legislature must also consider when a products liability statute of repose
259. See id.
260. Comment, Limiting Liability, supra note 97, at 142-44.
261. See Tex H.B. 2310, 67th Leg. (1981); Tex. H.B. 1161, 66th Leg. (1979); Tex. S.B.
263, 66th Leg. (1979); see also Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 555 n.2
(Tex. 1981) (Spears, J., dissenting) (various proposals considered by legislature); Keeton,
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1980) (discussion of legislative activity
in this area).
262. One such reform is the establishment of comparative fault mechanisms in strict
products liability. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 507 (1983); Kee-
ton, supra note 261, at 5.
263. See supra note 148 for the constitutional ramifications of this requirement.
264. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
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should begin to run. The most equitable trigger date appears to be the
date of delivery to the first user or purchaser not engaged in the business of
selling such products. A statute that runs from the date of manufacture
could cause harsh results because many products spend long periods of
time on a retailer's shelf. The statute should also include a grace period
that allows a plaintiff additional time to bring suit if his injury is discov-
ered within two years of the expiration of the statute. 265 Other exceptions
giving consumers additional time to sue should also be included in order
to mitigate the severity of the statute in certain circumstances. The Texas
medical liability statute, for instance, provides that it will be tolled for two
years if the plaintiff is under twelve years of age. 266 Since there is no justi-
fiable distinction between minors under twelve and those laboring under
other disabilities, a products liability statute of repose should also make
exception for other disabled plaintiffs. Exception should also be made for
actions based on indemnity, fraud, or express warranty. In this way third-
party claims against the manufacturer would be preserved, the defendant
would not be unjustly enriched by his own misrepresentations, and express
promises would be upheld. Finally, a products liability repose statute
could have the effect of abolishing the discovery rule, which Texas has
traditionally applied in products actions.267 Exception should therefore be
made for those cases in which the injury is not discoverable until many
years after sale, or is the result of prolonged exposure to a defective prod-
uct. Utilization of some or all of these exceptions will result in an equita-
ble distribution of the burdens associated with injuries caused by older
defective products and will avoid placing the entire burden on the injured
consumer.
A products liability statute of repose also raises serious constitutional
issues, because such a statute must meet the demands of equal protection
and due process. If the statute is drafted to include all those in the chain of
manufacture, however, and is rationally related to a permissible goal, it
will probably survive equal protection analysis. 268 Similarly, a statute of
repose should withstand a constitutional due process challenge if a reason-
able period of time is allotted for a party to assert his claim and a reason-
able legislative purpose for the limitation can be found. The fact that
Texas courts have taken the view that repose statutes extinguish a person's
claim before it ever arises and do not deprive a plaintiff of a vested right of
action 269 also supports the validity of the statute. A more difficult constitu-
tional objection to overcome, however, may be the Texas Constitution's
open court provision.270 If a statute of repose is held to abolish a common
law right of action, Texas courts generally must inquire whether the statute
265. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
266. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The con-
stitutionality of even this provision is, however, questionable in light of Sax v. Votteler.
267. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 256 for the text of this provision.
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represents a reasonable exercise of police power for the general welfare
and whether it substitutes a reasonable alternative remedy. 27' Since a
products liability statute of repose would not provide any alternative rem-
edy to a plaintiff who is barred from suit before the injury occurs, the
statute may not pass constitutional muster under the open court provision.
This result is particularly likely if the statute makes no exception for
minors.
In addressing such constitutional challenges to statutes of repose, Texas
courts have thus far found a permissible state objective in the reduction of
liability insurance costs. 272 The courts should question, however, whether
the goal of reducing insurance premiums is proper in light of the effect
statutes of repose have on a plaintiffs right to recover. Perhaps reform
should be aimed instead at what seems to be the crux of the manufacturers'
crisis, the insurance mechanism itself. Other product liability reforms, less
arbitrary and more responsive to the plaintiffs conduct, could be insti-
tuted, or more stringent evidentiary rules could be implemented. A useful
safe life concept would deal with most of the manufacturers' fears concern-
ing older products, while avoiding the deprivation of an injured con-
sumer's right of action. These reforms, in other words, could accomplish
what statutes of repose attempt to do and still provide a better balancing of
consumer and manufacturer interests.
Even assuming the constitutionality of a products liability statute of re-
pose, the Texas Legislature should question the wisdom of enacting such a
statute. Products liability in Texas has been for the most part a judicial
creation. The inherent flexibility of the judiciary permits a case-by-case
response to the many variables in products actions. A statute of repose
precludes a flexible response to these variables and may often lead to harsh
consequences. If Texas does decide to alter the statutes of limitation in
products actions, however, the legislature should be cognizant of these
conflicting interests and draft a statute of repose that strikes an equitable
balance between them.
V. CONCLUSION
The products liability crisis will probably not soon disappear, nor will
manufacturers and their insurers stop lobbying state legislatures for reform
of products liability statutes of limitation in an effort to cap long-term lia-
bility. Statutes of repose may well be among the most frequently sug-
gested and most often successful of proposed reforms, both in Texas and
elsewhere. These statutes, however, can cause harsh results by depriving a
consumer injured by an older product of his cause of action before it
arises. Much of this severity can be lessened by carefully drafted statutes
that balance the competing interests of the manufacturer and consumer
and by equitable judicial construction. These statutes do, however, effec-
271. Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 198, 275 S.W.2d 951, 954 (1955) (dis-
tinction between valid alteration of common law right and the abolition of that right).
272. See supra notes 233-59 and accompanying text.
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tively shift the burden in products liability cases involving older products
onto the consumer, a result that conflicts with the consumer protection pol-
icy that underlies products liability law. A product, if defective at the time
it left the manufacturer, is no less defective because of the passage of time.
A statute of repose, rather than cutting off a plaintiff's opportunity to sue
because of his delinquency, divests him of an important right. It appears,
in other words, to abort "the [plaintiff's] right of action, not in the first
trimester, but before conception. ''273
273. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Ky. 1973) (review of Kentucky statute of
repose).
[Vol. 37
